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Abstract
This chapter presents the results of a cognitive systems engineering approach applied to
railway systems. This application is through the methodology of ’System for Investiga‐
tion of Railway Interfaces – SIRI’. The utility of the chapter lies in highlighting errors in
the current approaches to safety risk management.
Keywords: Cognitive systems Engineering, Systems safety engineeering, Human factors
engineering, Risk and Decision Making
1. Introduction
This chapter presents the results of a cognitive systems engineering approach to safety, ’System
for Investigation of Railway Interfaces – SIRI’. The objectives of the application are to show:
a. How current methods to model, analyse, and manage safety risk do not facilitate learning
lessons from past accidents;
b. How the use of heuristics by decision makers induce biases into the Committee-based
decision-making process;
c. How failure of understanding amongst railway practitioners manifests when the attrib‐
utes of reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety (RAMS) are treated as inde‐
pendent parameters of a signalling system.
© 2015 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
The above failings are demonstrated by means of a case study of Cambrian European Railway
Train Management System – ERTMS – level crossing incident investigated by UK’s Rail
Accident Investigation Board(RAIB) in Jan 2012.
RAIB noted that a deviation to a safety critical requirement to interlock the function of the
barriers with the function of train protection (braking system) was granted by the Signalling
Standards Committee to the duty – holder organisation – Network Rail, without asking for a
human factors analysis or risk assessment to support the deviation request. This incident
occurred at the automatic barrier locally monitored type level crossing (ABCL). This chapter
provides the causal factors behind the decision to grant a deviation to safety critical require‐
ments.
This chapter draws upon author’s papers peer reviewed and published in the proceedings of
the IET International System Safety Conferences since 2006, and publicly available literature
[2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 11, 12].
The rest of the chapter is organised in this way: Section 1 provides the abstract of the chapter;
Section 2 shows why wrong-but-popular approaches to safety risk management persist in the
railway domain; Section 3 presents a case study using the SIRI methodology to help under‐
stand its application; Section 4 provides conclusions on subject matter of the chapter. Section
5 provides acknowledgements. Section 6 provides the references.
2. Explanation for persistence of wrong-but–popular approaches to safety
risk management: Doing the wrong thing right
OM. What instructions did the Blessed Lord give: Be compassionate. Be controlled.
Be charitable.
Sri Adi Śhankarāchārya, 8th Century AD, Brihadaranyaka Upanishad
Translated by Prof V. Roebuck [79]
Everything is fine today that is our illusion.
Voltaire, quoted by Douglass W. Hubbard [29]
We have inherited the neural mechanisms that evolved to provide ongoing
assessment of threat level, and they have not been turned off. Situations are
constantly evaluated as good or bad, requiring escaping or permitting approach.
Good mood and cognitive ease are the human equivalents of assessments of safety
and familiarity.
Nobel laureate and psychologist, Prof Daniel Kahneman (pp. 90) [36]
OM is the sacred symbol to denote Brahman in the Hindu religious literature. More informa‐
tion can be gained about the nature and meaning of the symbol from reading Prof Roebuck’s
writings [79]. Prof Charles Perrow, originator of Normal Accident Theory, recounted the
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abnormal blessings he had received from his co-researchers in his preface to second edition of
his book. Author speculates that Prof Charles Perrow did not know the source of abnormal
blessings for the success of Normal Accident Theory as he may have thought he had not prayed
for its success [49, 79]. In his survey of risk assessment theories and practices, Charles Perrow
did recognise the work of cognitive systems engineering experts and various kinds of rational‐
ities but opinied that these view points did not recognise the role of power in and of organisa‐
tions (pp. 379) [79]. Interpretating the reality of accident causal factors and represent them by
means of fault free fault tree analytical representation to show errors in the systems engineer‐
ing steps, in the professional opinion of the author, helps mitigate the problem of discounting
power of subject matter experts, and risk assessors in generating biased risk information in
producer and client, systems engineering and regulatory organisations (pp.65) [52].
From the vast literature on risk on the perspective of risk rationality in human affairs, it is easy
to think of four types of rationalities: omniscient rationality, which is enjoyed by political
economists like Nobel laureate Gary S. Baker, “bounded” or limited rationality advanced by
organisational decision scientist is and some risk assessors like Nobel laureate Herbert A.
Simon, irrationality as advocated by behavorial economists like Noble laureate Daniel
Kahneman, reluctant rationality of participants in making choices and displaying regret after
the fact who may regard false negative alarms (near miss incidents) as reliablity events [36,
62]. Typical example being NASA managerial judgements on the Challenger launch decision.
Neuro-scientists have identified human brain regions associated with emotional and cognitive
side of information processing activity when an individual processes a risky stimulus [36, 50].
Studies cited by Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman, Peter N.C. Mohr, and his co-workers draw
attention to the fact that decision maker(s) when engaged in the tasks of revealing preferences
or answering queries on uncertain situations such as questions on lottery, risk assessment, and
risk management do consult their emotions, and these decisions can be called decisions under
risk. Decision theorists like psychologists, philosophers, statisticians, and economists ap‐
proach decision making in a mathematical manner and are not prone to emotions and framing
effects felt in the case of non-decision scientist(s) asserted in these research papers. The idea
of risk as a rare event with odds of 1 in 400 or more with a consequence probability of 0.249%
is possible is acknowedged by Prof David Hand, an expert statistician [26]. In other words,
definition of rare events and estimation of the odds of their occurrence by expert statisticians
may be prone to error is the thesis advanced by Prof David Hand. Evidence for this thesis is
drawn by Prof David Hand from the case study of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome. Sir Roy
Meadow’s expert evidence led to erroneous legal prosecution of Sally Clarke. Rare event of
train and vehicle collision on the Great Britain railway track was experienced by the members
of the same family in the UK within a span of 15 years is cited as well [26]. The mean expected
rate for such random events to occur as per Poisson’s distribution is 0.741%. It is tempting to
arrive at a conclusion that operational reliability of the railway is very high, i.e. 99.25% based
upon the foregoing metric. Most pre–university students learn about stastitical distributions
in their final year of secondary school leaving stage. Students of risk management can easily
be laid into error if they are not careful in their thinking when making risk judgements that
involve casual inferences (pp. 166–67) [36]. The litmus test for any student of decision making
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and risk management is the case of NASA Space Shuttle Accident in 1986. This case study
alone poses challenge to statistical and rational decision theory, learning from past failure
incidents, theories of control, system safety, and risk management [5, 36, 49]. The signal of less
than adequate design shuttle vehicle flown by NASA and supported by its supplier, Morton
Thiokol, till the pre-launch decision was obscured or buried under the noise generated by the
hindsight observations of NASA manager’s pre-launch decision [5]. To its credit, NASA,
Langley Research News hosts the book on its website written by former Morton Thikol
engineering director, Allan Madonald, who had a change of heart without any apparent reason
on the pre-launch decision day and went along with engineer Roger Boisjoly who was opposed
to the launch decision [5], [55]. Risk management expert Douglass Hubbard is of the view that
Bayesian risk analysis may have helped in the case of NASA Challenger decision situation
where the failure data was scanty [29]. Bayesian risk analysis can certainly help if prior
information of categorial variables is available in the odds form and likelihood ratio of positive
and negative rates are known as well. But we ‘ve bear in mind Prof James Reason’s thesis that
most of us are not intutive bayesians [55]. Once Johann Wolfgang von Goethe observed that
it is much easier to recognize error than to find truth; the former lies on the surface, this is quite
manageable; the latter resides in depth, and this quest is not everyone’s business. No accident
researcher has the luxury of verifying correspondence between ideas of managerial oversight
and risk seeking behavior apart from relying upon lessons learn from behavioral science risk
literature (pp. 228) [53, 54].
The thesis advanced in the research papers in the area of cognitive psychology is that people
who resist intutive responses to following bat–ball question do not need to reflect on the
question again. The bat-–ball puzzle is as under. This question is to be answered in an intutive
manner without solving it on a paper.
A bat and ball costs £1.10.
The bat costs one dollar more than the ball.
How much does the ball cost?
The intutive answer is 10 cents. Many thousands of university students have answered the
bat–ball question. More than half of the undergraduate students at Harvard, MIT, Princeton
gave the intutive–incorrect –answer.
The failure rate at other American universities is even more higher at 80% (pp. 44–45) [36]. The
correct answer is 5 cents. Perhaps, a distinction between intelligence and rationality is needed
is the suggestion made by these researchers (pp. 49) [36].
The author observes that intutive errors in decisions made by these undergraduate students
cannot be explained by saying that these students are not skilled mathematicians. The author
speculates that the psychological mechanisms involved in the perceptual and cognitive
decision process by experimental subjects are as follows; mentally formulating the equations
to represent the quantities of prices involved, and then subtracting the equations to identify
one of the single unknown and arrive at its value by halving it. The difference between those
who get the right and wrong answers is simply this: failure to divide in the final equation.
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These errors are attributed by cognitive psychologists to the property of overconfidence of
subjects who answer the question as 10 cents. From the science of cybernetics perspective, the
purpose of the bat–ball question is to trigger thinking activity on decisions on safety-related
control systems where the safe state of the system cannot be perceived by sight and failures in
risk management and safety assurance process are likely [12, 28, 44, 57].
When author compares and evaluates the foregoing behavorial science research findings
against the research findings published within system safety research domain, then another
type of culture of decision-making emerges. Complexity of a socio-technical system became
the focus of attention of system safety researchers during the 1980s. Prof Charles Perrow (1984)
argued that complexity of organisations and tight-coupling of systems render it difficult to
foresee how rare accidents can occur. The problem of complexity poses serious challenge to
formal system safety management processes. Evidence is available to show that the counter
thesis of Normal Accident Theory namely, High Reliable Organisations, is negated by John
Bushby’s case study of two British railway accidents [16]. James Reason (1990) whilst advanc‐
ing a general view of accident causation in complex systems in the form of Swiss Cheese Model
observed that system (normal) accidents have their origin in latent failures (fallible decisions)
in supervisory control systems made at the corporate management, designer(s), and line
management levels. He noted that identifying latent errors is a challenge faced by human
factors researchers concerned with preserving the safety of complex, high-risk systems (pp.
199–216) [55]. Further, the author accepts Prof James Reason’s idea of latent error that it is
intimately bound up with the character of technology and accepts that tackling latent errors
by identifying resident pathogens is the most effective way to improve the safety of complex
systems (pp. 174) [55]. Prof Jens Rasmussen (1994) and his co-workers raised the question: are
managers willing to spend the effort required for effective risk management? They argued
senior managers like chief executive officers (CEOs) may not possess competence to deal with
discipline of system safety management as they are usually drawn from finance or legal
background (pp.159) [52]. System safety practitioners are to be found at lower levels in
organisation in situations where the mean time between fatal accidents is large and the tenure
of CEOs is short. In other words, CEOs do not get feedback on their performance in the field
of system safety risk management. Further, they argued that Prof James Reason’s approach
will encounter problems if large number of ’less than adequate’ conditions or decisions are
identified from the past accidents using causal trees included in the Management Oversight
and Risk Tree by William Johnson. However, applicant shows how the problem of representing
various less than adequate latent failures by way of fault tree representation, taking into
account the less-than-adequate decisions, is shown by the case study later on. This will show
where interventions may be necessary.
It is common to observe three strategies to manage risks of fatal accidents [2, 52]. The strategy
of emperical safety control used in the traffic and work domain is based upon ‘safety on the
average’ for high-frequency and low-consequence traffic accidents. The problem with the
strategy is that these measures may be degraded if the organisation is under economic
pressure. Author finds that Network Rail’s approach to change the specification of a signalling
cable without checking for unsafe conditions that may be generated during operations is one
example from the railway domain of this tendency to buckle under economic pressure as it
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was done in 2011. Risk management strategy of making design improvements after learning
lessons from investigation of medium size, infrequent accidents is practised within the railway
and aircraft domains. The third, risk management strategy followed is through the control of
hazards based upon use of multiple barriers or defences as in the nuclear domain based upon
predictive risk analysis (pp. 35–159), [52]. Prof Trevor Kletz argued that organisations suffer
from lack of memory in 2003 [38]. An UK Health & Safety Executive (HSE) Publication HSG
238 argued that safety-related control systems are bound to fail if the errors in the specification,
design, testing, commissioning phases (lifecycle factors) of control systems are not checked
and corrected [72, 73 ,74, 75]. Prof Nancy Leveson presented a new control systems engineering
method, named STAMP, for accident analysis, which included representations of legal, socio-
technical systems as well [40]. Knut Rygh, Chief System Safety Engineer, Accident Investiga‐
tion Board, Norway, stated in 2005 publication that it is an establised fact that a systematic
safety assessment is an accident investigation before the accident occurs (pp. 90–108) [63]. It
follows from the foregoing research facts that an occurrence of incident or an accident implies
that system safety case which documents the results of potential accident has either failed to
investigate the potential hazard in a thorough manner or system case documentation ignored
the hazard that could occur in the operations or lessons learnt from past accidents were
forgotten or unknown dangerous unforeseen mode of operation has occurred or incident
reporting system has failed or failures in risk management process were ignored or the
independent safety analysts organisation has used the safety target of Mean Time to Unsafe
Failure for safety case without using HAZOP + Fault Tree Analysis in the safety analysis of
complex systems [29, 33, 34]. Prof Derek Hitchins (2007) stated that systems engineering cannot
be carried out by the method discovered by Rene Descartes; dividing the problem space into
its parts to analyse the parts and a holistic method as a frame of reference is necessary [28].
Following the financial crisis in 2007/2008, the idea of Black Swan event was popularised by
Prof Nicholas Taleb [36]. Prof John Adams (2009) argued that economics of safety is a debate
that is not settled as moral attitudes towards risk management are not stable; they depend
upon the individual or social cultural perspective invovled in the debate [1]. Nobel laureate
Daniel Kahneman (2011) argued that senior executives lack robust decision-making process
and are prone to committing same errors like others as well [36]. Further, most railway, house-
hold kitchen, and weapons system projects fail to attain their objective due to planning fallacy
as noted by him drawing upon the evidence of 2005 Oxford study. Prof David Hand (2015)
argued using the evidence of 2008 financial crisis that risk inherent in the finance operations
is better handled by Cauchy distribution as the decision-making framework of Gaussian means
and variance leads to under-estimation of fat-tail risk events. During the financial crisis in 2008,
it was revealed that Goldman Sachs’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO) reported 25 standard
deviation events occuring in a row in their operations [26]. Readers may wish to look up the
probability of 25 Sigma event on the freely available online website – Wolfram Computational
Engine. This works out to be 6.113 E-10–138 or a chance event of obtainning a head in all tosses
of 456 fair coins. These rare events have occurred several times during the course of the past
two decades. This failure in understanding risk is labelled in the safety risk literature as latent
error. If latent errors are not cognised, then there is no way to address them. Therefore, switch
to Bayesian risk management is required. However, Prof David Hand’s work illustrates how
abuse of statistics can occur [26].
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The following are the definitions for latent and active errors.
Definition: Active errors are human errors, whose effects are felt almost immediately. For
example, a road user may enter a level crossing space when it is not safe to do so due to wrong-
side failure of the level crossing as in the case of the Herefordshire level crossing accident in
2011 [2, 11].
Definition: Latent errors are human errors whose adverse consequences may lie dormant
within the system for a long time, only becoming evident when they combine with other factors
to breach system (production) defences. For example, wrong-side failure event of the level
crossing caused by the signaller who raised the barrier needed a conjuction of events of lack
of approach locking and a road user entering the crossing space simultaneously to manifest
the Herefordshire level crossing accident in 2011 [2, 11]. The independent accident investigat‐
ing organisation, RAIB, reasoned, by way of counter-factual reasoning, that if the level crossing
were to be fitted with approach locking facility, then the signaller would have been prevented
from raising the road barriers, after they have been lowered. The causal statement was accepted
by all organisations invovled in the situation according to the intutive frame of reference in
the language of Prof Jens Rasmussen. Rather than questioning the scenario as to why the train
did not stop at the level crossing signal fitted with Train Protection Warning System (TPWS)
when stop signal was replaced, RAIB remained satisfied with the answer they found [2]. Based
upon behavorial research discussed earlier, lack of cognitive reflection is implied and author
concludes that this is a sign of irrationality. In human error terms, this act of omission can be
called violation by element and duty holder as well.
Now, let us look at the other reasons for failures to recognise latent errors. First, lack of
familiarty with the cognitive system engineering approach advocated by Prof Jen Rasmussen
and his co-authors in the railway domain signalling and telegraph, human factors, safety and
risk experts [52, 54]. Consequence of the lack of familiarity is the exclusion of certain stake‐
holders organisations’ contribution to risk. Prof Jens Rasemussen’s approach demands that
cognitive system analysis shall include all stakeholder organisations and their contribution
(positive or negative) towards system safety performance must be represented. These contri‐
butions are captured by way of a graphical representation in the form of Accimap [32, 52, 54].
Evidence for the lack of familiarity of contribution of human errors in management field can
be seen in the case of the popular quantitative risk assessments made up of fault and event
tree model. These representations are used by industrial practitioners for identifying accident
precursors to safety risk, but do not include latent errors [24, 56]. The latent errors are errors
committed in the areas of risk policy, domain-specific safety standards, which are industry
consensus standards, and ignore errors in system design, risk assessments, independent safety
assessments and reviews, and risk management that lead to less than sub-optimal diagnosis
of potential or actual hazards. And as a result, risk assessors and managers pay less attention
to less than adequate barriers for controlling hazards can be seen from the documentation on
hazard analysis, modelling, risk analysis, and management of individual and societal risk
concerns [17, 24, 60, 61, 72, 74, 75, 77]. Recommendations from the UK HSE Guidance on safety
relevant control systems are not followed in these documents [73, 74]. When accidents do occur,
front-line staff or members of public get blamed for less than adequate designs with which
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these actors have to grapple as it can be seen in the case of assertion made in the publication
by a team of railway signalling and train driving managers and this blame culture was
investigated as well [25, 80].
All psychologists hold the thesis that human mind cannot estimate the probabilities or
likelihood of rare events which lie between the interval of zero to one percentile and ninety-
nine percentile of distribution of probabilities and errors in judgements arise due to basic
inability in human thinking (pp. 315) [36]. Misconceptions of chances and lack of recognition
of co-variation do occur in the railway industry is asserted by the author following Prof James
Reason’s work. For example, collision of a train with a vehicle on the track was regarded as
once-in-a million kind of chance event by a member of public is cited by Prof David Hand [26].
The author found that the probability of Hixon level crossing accident was reckoned by S. Hall,
a British Rail signalling expert (1991)to be one in a million kind of chance event [2, 11].
However, the RSSB (formerly Rail Safety and Standards Board) Report tells a different story
of high likelihood of more than ten collisions events per year [59]. If readers think that progress
may have been made since 1990s, then they will be disappointed to read that errors in risk
modelling by Network Rail/RSSB All Level Crossings Risk Model were reported in the UK
House of Commons Report in 2014 [71]. Combining two pieces of information such as RSSB’s
statistical data with the causes identified in the RAIB accident reports poses a problem of
inferrring causes of level crossing accidents. This problem is logically equivalent to the problem
of applying Bayes rule to the taxi-cab problem cited in the risk literature (pp. 166–167) [36].
Second explanation is that the majority of railway domain experts, i.e. engineers and managers,
are not aware of errors in their statistical, economical, logical, ontological, and cosmological
reasonings of railway accidents [26, 32, 36, 42, 50, 55, 67].
For example, if reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety properties of systems and
human actors forming part of a given social-technical system are considered in an unified
manner, then it is clear they are not to be treated as independent parameters as it is assumed
in classical economical theories is demonstrated by sociologist Prof Charles Perrow and system
safety theorist Prof Nancy Leveson as well [40, 49]. Prof Charles Perrow argued that errors in
sub-systems in the system lifecycle factors may interact in unforseen ways; and as a result of
these unwanted interactions, risk of an accident cannot be foreseen and pre-determined.
Therefore, some high-risk technologies like nuclear plants that are prone to acccidents should
be avoided. Rare events like nuclear power accidents require more time to manifest not
withstanding the claims of risk assessors and managers to the contrary [13, 17, 49, 57]. The
author found this reasoning to be true in the cases of NASA Space Shuttle Challenger and
Japanense Nuclear accidents where errors in risk assessment led to under-estimating of fatal
risk in terms of its likelihood [5, 6]. RSSB does not apply the requirements in the risk guidance
from cognitive perspective issued to the industry to itself and fails to identify risk in its
management systems are shown by the case study in the paper [58, 59, 60, 61].
The author is led to the insight on human and scoial cognition, drawn from works of Nobel
laureates Herbert A. Simon, Daniel Mcfadden, and Daniel Kahneman, that cognitive errors
in information processing activity do exist [36, 42, 55, 67]. Insight drawn from the work of
Nobel laureate, Herbert Simon (1978), is that the fundamental limitation of human cognition
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in organisational context gives rise to satisficing behaviour: tendency to settle for satisfacto‐
ry rather than optimal courses of action; this is discussed in the text on the topic of bounded
rationality in Section 3.3.1 of the Chapter 2 on cognitive science tradition by James Reason
[55]. In the same text, Reason observed that this is true for both individual and collective
decision  making  and  cites  Cyert  and  March  (1963)  who  demonstrated  organisational
planners are inclined to compromise their goal setting by choosing minimal objectives rather
than those likely to lead to best outcome. Organisational behaviour needs to become the
focus of attention [15]. Two examples of the necessity to focus on this social tendency to
compromise goals can be read from the evidence of failure of the High Speed 2 Business
Case in the UK House of Lords Economics Affairs Committee Report and failure in the
case of Chinese ERTMS Train Crash [14, 68].
Third, Prof James Reason advanced the idea of controlling safer operations by identifying the
pathogens hidden in the senior and line management decisions and practices that feed into
psychological precursors of unsafe acts is the best way of controlling safer operations [55].
These hidden pathogens are best discovered, as per the author’s knowledge, by using the
Management Oversight and Risk Tree to include human failings in risk assessment, risk
management, engineering management, and investment management. This idea is supported
byProf Jens Rasmussen as well. The problem of determining the risk in a qualitative or
quantitaive manner is subject to professional biases is noted by Prof David Ball in the UK HSE
Research Report 034 on how to understand and respond to the societal concerns. He observed
that a risk management strategy cannot be promoted without a belief that one way of life, or
one way of sharing risks and costs, is better than another [73]. Questions of will to impose harm
on others and acting under ignorance are philosophical questions if we disregard the legal and
bounded rationality perspective for a moment [66, 67]. Acting upon information generated by
FN curves by means of RSSB’s Safety Risk Model or FN curve data analysis without taking
into account decision-making under uncertainty is an error is noted by Prof Andrew Evans in
his study of transport accidents. The literaruture by Prof Andrew Evans shows how FN curves
are constructed [76].
The HSE Report 034 had emphasised the need to incorporate plural views into decision
making, while acknowledging that these will be based substantially on beliefs, values and
ways of categorising the world, rather than upon objective information [73]. Role culture plays
an important role is shown by Prof John Adams as well. In other words, bias will unavoidably
be encountered, and ultimately the question may well come down to choosing one form of
bias over another. Further, the following features characterise risk-based decision-making:
• not all values are equal – some can be more thoroughly justified than others (moral philos‐
ophy) and some – when applied – produce better practical results than others
• a risk management strategy cannot be promoted without having an opinion that one way
of life is better than another.
• risk management is essentially political – the only honest and open way forward is to admit
this and embrace it
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The Skills-Rules-Knowledge taxonomy advanced by Prof Jens Rasmussen is applicable to the
co-operative archictecture of work which is applicable to the current regime of risk manage‐
ment within the Europe as well [53, 54, 55]. Duty of co-operation is mandated by the UK Rail
Regulator as well [46]. Contrary to the advice that emerges from reading the management
literature that safety and production planning should not be placed lower than finance and
planning activity in the hierarchy of management concerns, it is common place to find
economic concerns being prioritsed ahead of the safety concerns in the industrial context. From
cognitive science perspective, this act of compromising safety is a violation (pp. 206), [55].
The cognitive biases and information processing flaws were identifed by Prof Andrew.P. Sage
as well. These flaws affect information formulation for acquisition, analysis, and interpretation.
These can be read from the works of Prof Andrew P. Sage [47]. These flaws are based on those
identified in the works of 1974 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s paper [36].
The following are the biases that have come to the author’s attention as a result of his own
research on system risk assessment and management.
1. Incomplete data. Failure to include uncertainty in the scientific estimates of reliability,
availability, and maintainability of digital signalling systems including communication
systems as a whole. I know the report is damning, and it may be based upon solid
evidence, but how sure are we? We must allow for that uncertainty in our thinking.
2. Defence-in-depth fallacy. Fallacy on the part of computing science experts who entertain the
idea that graceful degradation of automated information processes (fault tolerant
architecture) shall be fail safe as the automated system is designed to stop the process
under control if in doubt over the data (how the computer will doubt its input data, its
own logic, and the outputs it generated if it has no access to real world like human beings
is not questioned?);
3. Affect Heuristic and/or planning fallacy. The transport programme has large benefits and no
major costs. I suspect the affect heuristic. No one pays attention to the fact of failure of
90% of the large railway projects to attain the cost, and passenger targets has been cited
in a 2005 study. The great and good in the company are agreed with the programme
mission and they like their plans. I suspect Affect and satisficing heuristic and planning
fallacy [36].
4. Narrative fallacy. The consulting engineer is learning too much from the recent £1 billion
project success, which is too tidy. The engineer has fallen for a narrative fallacy.
5. Out of mind out of sight bias. The fault tree and event tree analysis of the train crashes do
not show any management and technical errors. I suspect ‘out of mind out of sight bias’.
6. Blame Game. The train failed in the tunnel. The communcation between the trackside and
train-based equipment did not take place in the degraded scenario due to operator error.
The computer simulation did not test this scenario. I smell the ‘blame game’.
7. Gambler’s fallacy. Clear-cut information about the probablity of an event is not taken into
account because people believe that chance is a self-correcting process, such that a
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deviation in one direction will necessarily be followed by a deviation in the opposite
direction. ‘The shares have been falling for the railway firm, it is time to buy as the trend
will reverse’. Gambler’s fallacy can be seen as a factor in the explanation of Saint Peters‐
burg paradox described in the literature.
The expected value of the game as a sum of the product of probability of loss or gain multiplied
by the values of the outcomes considered by the decision maker(s) or taker(s) is poor psychol‐
ogy is noted by Nobel Laureate, Daniel Kahneman. These type of erroneous arguments can be
seen in the case of level crossings [25].
8. Illusion of Invincibility bias. The supplier has announced a new train protection system
which is designed to be fail safe and uses mutliple but redundant channels for information
processing. Full moon effect on information processing is not recognized. I suspect
‘Illusion of invincibility bias’.
9. Expert’s Subjective Risk Bias. The supplier has furnished us the risk register for the antici‐
pated risks. The hazard mitigation method is noted by the domain experts, but the method
of hazard control is insufficent for the risk. I suspect ‘Expert’s Subjective Bias’.
Allais paradox: Norms of Expected Utility Theory and axioms of Rational Choice were violated
due to certainty effect by expert statisticians and future Laureates in Economics in the following
decision situation is cited by Laureate economist Daniel Kahneman (pp. 310–321) [36], (pp. 39)
[55].
Decision I: choose 61% of £520,000 or 63% of £500,000
Decision II: choose 98% of £520,000 and 100% of £500,000
10. Railway Senior Managers’s Fallacy. The train driver has the ultimate responsibility for the
safety of the train and passengers and has to comply with signal commands. We have
robust systems for recruiting, training, developing, and certifying the train staff. Our
operating rules and regulations are robust. The train drivers can handle the emergency
and normal situations with cognitive work load.
11. Our experience has shown that signalling systems are functioning correctly after the
accident. I suspect ‘Senior Manager’s Fallacy’.
12. Railway Engineer’s fallacy. Human intuitions are prone to errors and mistakes. Train
driver’s response is too slow for attaining productivity target. Let us automate the train
driving task. I suspect ‘Engineer’s fallacy’.
13. Instrumentalism Fallacy. Give a small boy a hammer, and he will find that everything he
encounters needs pounding. I suspect instrumental fallacy.
14. Geometer’s Fallacy. Noble laureate and a physicist, Albert Einstein, in his phenomenalogical
experience wrote that old geometers like Euclid dealt with conceptual objects (straight
line, point, surface) but not really with space, such as was done later in Descartes’s
analytical geometry [20]. We must be careful of the lack of connection between geometry
and physics. I suspect Geometer ‘Engineer’s fallacy’.
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15. Measurement Fallacy. Risk not measured is not managed. Let us quantify the risk of rare
events according to Poisson method and justify that it is acceptable as the greater good of
the society is served by ignoring so-called wider human factors. I suspect Measurement
Fallacy.
16. Concrete Jungle Fallacy. European and American city dwellers have a much higher
percentage of rectangularity in their environments than non-Europeans and so are more
susceptible to Muller-lyer illusion. Muller-lyer illusion occurs when two lines of equally
long parallel lines with arrow tails placed at the end visually appear longer.
17. Coherence Bias. The plan to implement the requirements as a decision rule has been agreed
by domain experts. But this plan fails to meet the decision criteria for cognitive adequacy
and safety requirements. Warnings about the inadequacy are dismissed as soon as raised.
The operator’s inattention due to distractions in the environment to execute the task is
ignored. I suspect group–think bias [4, 36].
18. Fault and event tree analysis bias. Goldman Sach’s (error cited earlier) bug is not acknowl‐
edged by mechanical approach to change management in organisations without paying
attention to the nature and behaviour of organisations and blindly relying upon methods
like fault and event trees are prone to error [13, 16, 17, 25, 55, 65, 78].
Some of the above latent human factors that may contribute to any of the potential ERTMS
accident was noted by Sanjeev Appicharla in 2013 [6, 8]. The author refers the reader(s) to an
excellent online 2010 report by Felix Redmill in the computing science domain on how to judge
if the safety risks are ALARP via a decision-making process [57]. There is no unanimous
agreement on the use of ALARP principle as per the UK House of Lords Report [77]. However,
the Redmill’s 2010 Report does not take into account all errors in information processing of
choices revealed to us by economists and psychologists in general and Nobel laureates, Herbert
A. Simon, Daniel Mcfadden, and Daniel Kahneman in particular [36, 42, 67]. The author does
not subscribe to the idea automated risk assessement tools such as genetic alogrithms are of
help. Readers may note that SIRI methodology is a engineering methodology to assist system
and safety analysis of engineered systems by taking into account success and failure scenarios
and based upon the theory of decision-making under uncertainty in the data and decision-
making process [35, 37]. The challenges posed by problems of complexity, causality, overcon‐
fidence, human error, hindsight and outcome biases, bounded rationality, economic choices,
cognitive limitations, out of sight out of mind bias, halo effect, omissions and oversight has to
be met by any methodology to be used for decision making for the assurance of system safety
risk management of complex engineered systems [55].
In this section, idea as to why some wrong approaches to safety risk management relying upon
risk-benefit analysis or fault and event tree analysis or reactive risk management persist was
discussed.
In the next section, the case study of ERTMS Cambrian Safety Critical Incident is taken up to
show how the foregoing concepts are logically demonstrated in the case study of Cambrian
ERTMS Safety Critical Incident.
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3. Analysis and modelling of cambrian ERTMS safety critical incident
To manage the hazardous (potential or actual) situations, the different steps followed in the
system and safety analysis as per SIRI methodology are as follows [3].
a. Developing description of an operational railway (system modelling process through
architecture context diagrams, operational process diagrams, parameters diagram,
and/or event causal flow analysis and agree emergent properties). This activity is usually
carried out within a team and process is used to elicit domain knowledge through
representation of diagrams such that a validated design or concept diagram is taken as
input to the next stage of the SIRI methodology;
b. Identifying hazards (hazards identification process through hazard and operability
(HAZOP) study, a team-based acitivity by HAZOP Chair);
c. Modelling accident scenarios (causal analysis process through Energy and Barrier Trace
Analysis to identify harmful energy sources, victims, and barriers; failures of barriers
detected through the application of Management Oversight and Risk Tree questionnaire
and compare results with Skills–Rules–Knowledge Framework and Swiss Cheese Model
to identify latent errors and develop the Hazard and Causal Factors Analysis Report.
These tasks are to be carried by HAZOP Chair and Secretary)
d. Performing risk assessment and developing countermeasures (risk assessment process
through Bayesian risk analysis and/or binomial distributions or Cauchy distributions to
work out base rates, these results may be needed to be incorporated with MORT Analysis.
Risk analyst and HAZOP Chair)
e. Preparation of impact assessment and documentation of results and release for stake‐
holders’ consultation or peer review (impact assessment process, HAZOP Chair and
MORT Analyst)
The last three steps may involve iterative process between them; processing of develop‐
ing understanding may require intermediate stages to store the results on a draft version
to revisit  the branches of Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) questions from
engineering and risk management perspectives. A red, green, amber light marking system
may be  needed  as  each  sequence  of  energy  transfer  process  may  need  to  be  revisited.
Further, as the original Management Oversight and Risk Tree in 1974 was developed with
an understanding that at the design phase engineers and their managers will  be able to
perceive, concieve, and act upon the identified hazards before the close out of the design
process [35, 37]. However, as the railway domain does not use the concept of affordance
of harm from the system as a design criterion as required by human factors engineering
process, it is necessary to consider various heuristics used by designers and operators and
resulting  biases  that  may  arise  at  the  design  as  well  as  operational  time  in  the  risk
assessment, safety verification, and valdiation phases [5, 6].
It is assumed that HAZOP Chair and Risk Analyst roles will be performed by competent
persons. In terms of meeting systems engineeering and safety standards set by engineering
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institutions such as Institution of Electrical and Electronic Engineers – IEEE std 1220 or
International Electro-technical Commission – IEC 61508 or sector-specific European Commit‐
tee for Electro-technical Standardisation – CENELEC 50126, the two stage processes of system
and safety analysis can be complied and implemented with the help of SIRI methodology [6].
To produce a model of an operational railway, the model should be able to reflect the real
world closely. The operational railway includes several interfaces in all operational circum‐
stances:
a. Man–machine interface (driver–line signals, signaller–automatic route setting, driver–
train, etc.)
b. Machine–machine interface (interlocking – lineside signals, ATP-train brake, ERTMS-
interlocking, ERTMS-fixed and mobile telephony, mobile telephony to ETCS, etc.)
c. Man procedures (operational procedures, work instructions, etc.)
d. Organisational interfaces (safety standards, failure management, hazard control between
duty holders, between duty holders and industry bodies, between various types of
organisations)
However, the present modelling languages suffer from a disadvantage in the sense that they
tend to superimpose their own order on existing systems and fail to capture the rich partial
order present in the system.
The application of the SIRI methodology to the incident situation under study is described.
The RAIB Accident Investigation Report is used as the input document alongside the MORT
(2002) questionnaire.
The RAIB Summary is reproduced here.
Shortly before 22:00 hrs on Sunday, 19 June 2011, a passenger train, travelling from Aberyst‐
wyth to Machynlleth, ran onto the level crossing at Llanbadarn while the barriers at the
crossing were raised, and came to a stop with the front of the train about 31 metres beyond the
crossing. There were no road vehicles or pedestrians on the crossing at the time. The immediate
cause of the incident was that the train driver did not notice that the indicator close to the
crossing was flashing red until it was too late for him to stop the train before it reached the
crossing. Factors behind this included the driver’s ‘Increased work load’ (his need to observe
a screen in the cab at the same time as he should also be observing a lineside indicator), the
design of the equipment associated with the operation of the level crossing, and the re-setting
of the signalling system on board the train before it could depart from Aberystwyth. An
underlying cause of the incident was that the signalling system now in use on the lines from
Shrewsbury to Aberystwyth and Pwllheli does not interface with the automatic level crossings
on these routes.
The RAIB has made six recommendations, three directed to Network Rail, two to Arriva Trains
Wales, and one to the Rail Safety and Standards Board. These cover the development of
engineering solutions to mitigate the risk of trains passing over automatic crossings which
have not operated correctly; changes to the operating equipment of Llanbadarn crossing; the
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processes used by railway operators to request permission to deviate from published stand‐
ards; the operational requirements of drivers as trains depart from Aberystwyth; and the way
in which drivers interact with the information screens of the cab signalling used on the
Cambrian lines.
3.1. System analysis diagram
To enable, visualise, and reason about risk manager behaviour in general operating situation
within the real world, the author has prepared an adapted version of diagram of Prof Jens
Rasmussen’s Skills-Rules-Knowledge Framework within Cognitive Science tradition. The
diagram does not show actual mental world of an individual, but it is a model or a represen‐
tation to be used by SIRI Analyst to reason about certain behaviour in philosophical, teleolog‐
ical, cultural, and scentific traditions of thinking and reasoning reflected in the literature on
risk. However, it should be noted that this model does not reflect real truths. As Prof David
Hand has written, one must revert to religion or pure mathematics for learning absolute truths
[26]. It only shows a frame to reason about heuristics which allows response (automatic or
reasoned) to the questions on risks or operator’s actions in the real danger situation as well as
shortfalls in risk or investment actions reasoned in the mangerial thinking.
To enable  easy  comprehension of  the  context  of  the  UK railway industry  operations,  a
system diagram is  prepared.  This  is  shown in Figure 1.  This  is  an architectural  context
diagram (ACD) showing stakeholder organisations involved in the context of the Cambri‐
an ERTMS Incident. From a systems engineering perspective, organisations forming part
of the railway system are Network Rail and Passenger or Freight operating (not shown in
the  figure)  companies,  European  Railway  Agency,  RSSB,  RAIB  are  system  supporting
organisations whereas Department of Transport is the ultimate owner of the UK Railway
System. Office of Rail Regulator, ORR, is a regulatory organisation. Element organisations
like Alstom, Siemens,  Ansaldo,  Bombardier,  Invensys,  and Thales that  supply signalling
solutions  are  represented  as  contractors.  Professional  engineering  societies  which  train,
license, and certify individuals to meet the railway industrial needs are not represented in
the  diagram,  but  are  recognised  as  institutions  contributing  to  human  capital  develop‐
ment and as consequence to risk management as per Noble laureate and economist, Gary
Becker’s  perspective  [62].  Notified  bodies  or  project  safety  organisations  are  treated  as
entities  acting as  contractors  providing safety auditing,  assessment,  advice,  and accredi‐
tion. The brief details of European Process validation and certification process is defined
in the Section 5.5.3 of the uic Compendium on ERTMS [81].
From system analytical perspective, the definition of an organisation offered by Nobel Herbert
Simon that organisations are adaptable systems made up of physical, technical, and human
resources and exhibit what is known as ‘satisficing behaviour’ is accepted in this chapter [67].
The solid red lines in the above figure indicate safety critical interfaces and functions and
dotted red line indicates influences emerging from accident investigations. Symbol 1 indicates
ORR is legally independent of the Secretary of State. Symbol 2 indicates Passenger Focus is an
independent body set up by the UK Government to protect the interests of passengers.
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3.2. Hypothetical HAZOP study
The description of hazard identification and analytical methods used in the SIRI methodology
is available in the published litearture. It is a hazard identification technique promoted by the
UK Intuition of Chemical Industry in the early 1970s [17].
From the information gathered from the summary section, paragraph 95 and 177 of the RAIB
Report, the critical interface between stakeholder organisations, Network Rail, the owner of
the rail infrastructure and Arriva Trains Wales (ATW), the passenger train operating company
at the operational time is the interface between driver’s eye ball and the driver crossing
indicator [51]. This is identified as Driver_ Perception of the Driver Crossing Indicator (DCI)
and is the emergent property to be conserved in this study and operations as well.
The indicator was flashing red giving dynamic information to the train driver, but driver’s
response was delayed and the train did not stop ahead of the level crossing, indicating a safety
critical deviation. From the SIRI methodological perspective, after Driver_ Perception is a
safety critical deviation as the event of driver perception occurred after the braking point
despite stopping ahead of the crossing space. Reading of the para 100 and subsequent text of
RAIB Report suggests that signaller made mistake in setting the routes which led to a timing
sequence problem, leading to the event of the opening of the barriers prior to the event of train
Figure 1. Architecture Context Diagram of the Railway Industry. Adapted from the UK National Audit Office Report
(The UK National Audit Office 2010).
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passing over the crossing space. The chain of events leading from this pre-cursor event is not
discussed as the parameter of interest in the hypothetical HAZOP study is Driver_ Perception
of the Driver Crossing Indicator in the sequence of events desired and its late occurrence.
Suffices to note that signaller’s error is a latent error and it is clear that human factor analysis
of the signaller’s task post implementation was not carried out. This is a latent error from the
Common Safety Method’s perspective as well [11].
Moreover, the design intent of ERTMS signalling automatic train protection (ATP) system is
to provide the signal to programmable electronic system giving information on safe speeds
and stopping points in Full Supervision (FS) Mode [82]. Thus, from the ERTMS signalling
system function perspective, the emergent property which is to be conserved by trackside sub-
system to on-board train system critical interface is Provide_ Signal.
But the national signalling infrastructure and human factors are excluded from the scope of
Signalling Supplier’s Consortium’s (UNISIG) safety analysis. Further, the Compendium on
ERTMS notes in Section 8.3.2 that the Index 47 document contained in the Chapter 6, risk
analysis performed by two member states resulted in different interpretations of the hazard
lists [82]. Given the fact that certain signalling entities and human factors are excluded, then
the questions on the purpose of the European Train Control System(ETCS) to provide the train
driver with information to enable drive the train safely and to enforce respect for this information is not
satisfied if Driver _Perception _ Crossing Indicator is not included in the movement authority
information. This discovery should provoke thoughts on the requirements management
process used in the programme management of ETCS programes. This incident has shown
that the design intent as per RGS GE/RT 8026 was not met [51].
The sample HAZOP worksheet for automatic train protection system adapted from the IEC
61822 standard for HAZOP study is shown in Figure 2. From reading the text in the para of
the RAIB investigation, para 157 it is clear that the movement authority across the crossing
was issued without stopping information ie No _ Provide_ Signal [51]. From this hypothetical
HAZOP study and RAIB information, it is clear that trackside sub-system was not configured
for the emergent property Provide_ Signal at the ABCL Level Crossings. If a real HAZOP study
were to be conducted, then this failure may provoke thinking about the adequacy of study of
failure scenarios and barriers as well.
Absence of the road user at the crossing space averted the potential accident. The real accident,
if it had occurred, may have led to a range of outcomes with the loss of life as well as public
and media outrage, if too many fatalities had resulted from it.
Figure 3 shows the schematic diagram of Llanbadarn ABCL facility. This figure may have to
be zoomed to 180% or above to gain visual clarity. At the minimum, actions as planned under
the risky scenario of raised barriers and stopping train front stopping 31 metres beyond the
crossing space would have certainly resulted in a collision between the road and the rail
vehicle, given the present understanding of laws of physics [48].
The absence of road user at the same time when the train passed the ABCL crossing space in
error is judged by the SIRI analyst to be an ‘act of God’, as the intention of all stakeholder
organisations such as regulating, specifying, developing, designing, manufacturing, supply‐
Application of Cognitive Systems Engineering Approach to Railway Systems...
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/61527
97
ing, utilising, and maintaining the ABCL design is to allow road users (without committing
an error) to pass through the crossing space when barriers are raised.
Non-provision of engineered safety feature in the contemporary ABCL design is a signalling
engineering induced (latent) error at the RSSB Standards Committee Level whereas driver’s
delay in departing and arriving at the strike in point may be signaller (active) induced error.
Figure 2. Sample HAZOP worksheet for ATP system.
Figure 3. Schematic diagram of Llanbadarn ABCL.
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The SIRI methodology adopts a system-induced error approach; and therefore, it is necessary
to look at errors from a holistic perspective. The lack of compatability of requirements between
Railway Group Safety Standard GE/RT 8026 and European Norm for ERTMS/ETCS System is
a glaring omission in the area of railway safety risk management [46]. It shows intelligence
failure on the part of all organisations. This type of failure was investigated in the GB Railway
domain in 1976 by Barry A. Turner as well [78].
3.3. System safety analysis: Application of Energy Barrier Trace Analysis – EBTA, Skills–
Rules–Knowledge (SRK) and Management and Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) methods
Management and Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) is an analytical technique for identifying
safety-related oversights, errors, and/or omissions, or assumed risks that lead to occurence of
an incident or accident [17, 35]. The MORT diagram uses of the logic of fault tree. It contains
two main branches. One related to control of technical factors denoted by letters SB, SD, etc.,
which are leaves of the causal tree and representing system life-cycle factors. Another branch
relates to management branch denoted by letters such MA, MB. Leaves within these branches
are noted by lower case letters a1, b2, etc., which relate these events to questions listed in the
MORT User Manual [17, 35].
The MORT Report contains following acronyms:
LTA: less than adequate
DN: did not
FT: failed to
HAP: hazard analysis process
The description of the concept of operations is drawn from the ORR documentation, RSSB
Railway Group Standards, and is based upon the author’s past experience of chairing HAZOP
study at RSSB for generic ABCL facility and described using the generic Event Causal Factors
(ECFA) analysis chart. This is shown in Figure 4. This may be required to enlarge till 180% to
gain visual clarity on the computer screen.
The description of the expected event sequence to form a coherent description uses a particular
notation of ECF analysis. The criteria to be used to read the event sequence diagram follows.
• Events must describe an occurrence, not a condition,
• Events must be described with at least one noun or verb,
• Occurrences must be precisely described,
• Events must describe one discrete action,
• Events are enclosed in rectangles and connected to other events as a forward chain using
horizontal arrows,
• Conditions are enclosed in ovals and are connected to events by vertical arrows,
• Events should range from beginning to end of the particular method of operation,
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• Each event should be derived from the one preceding event save for initiating event,
• Colour coding is used to distinguish infrastructure manager (IM), railway undertaking or
train operating (RU) domain, and user domain,
• Events are labelled with number or letters to identify the sequential flow of events in
respective duty holder domain.
The Concept of Operations describes the operational scenario when the train is approaching
the warning board and the train driver is in vigilant mode of information processing. However,
the desription of the incident RAIB (paragraph 110) informs that the event of approaching the
warning board was delayed due to train entering Staff Responsible, SR, mode [70]. The ABCL
being located near the station inserted a delay in the normal specification of the ABCL task
analysis, and no separate task analysis was performed by the Railway Understaking (RU) in
question. The time to approach to the level crossing space is specified in the form of a time
interval and no account was taken in the variation in the time for the tasks to be performed by
the train driver due to differernt operating modes was undertaken by RSSB before granting
deviation to the safety critical requirements specified in the Railway Group Standard – RGS
GE/RT 8026 [51].
This is a latent error embedded into the system where engineering and organisational errors
are committed. This is an instance of Railway Senior Managers and Engineer Fallacies. Further,
this latent error refutes the European Railway Agency, and RSSB’s idea that the management
and regulation of the railway is designed to ensure that – if each transport operator meets its
obligations with respect the safety of its own operation and the state also fulfils its duties –
then the sum of the parts will lead to a whole that is safe. Further, the RSSB statement does not
fit the idea of systems thinking that whole is more than sum of its parts. This idea is entertained
by system engineers as well as human factors specialists. Moreover, this error does not align
with the Best Practice of Decisions Under Risk of Prospect Theory, which is acknowledged by
RSSB in its July 2014 document [6]. Given the nature of the latent error, it is clear that this
decision not to conduct workload assessment is a violation from RSSB’s own Best Practice for
Human Factors Risk and Safe Decision Taking [58, 61].
Given the Concept of Operations diagram which the author has developed, introducing timing
analysis into the scheme is not a difficult issue if the data from the human factors engineering
is included as well. From the direct inspection of events sequence described in the diagrams
shown in the Figure 4, the expected event labelled E-IM-13 in the Network Rail domain flashing
white aspect, and contrary to the expected event labelled E-RU-6 in the Arriva Train Wales
domain, the red light was perceived, suggesting that the barriers were raised and an obstruc‐
tion may be expected in the path ahead of the train.
Realising this fact, train driver applied brakes but the train did not stop short of the crossing.
Since this constitutes a safety critical deviation, it is necessary to inquire further as to why the
driver’s response was slow and what shaped that behaviour. The train driver’s action was a
skill-based error type where the spatio-temporal response was delayed [12, 36, 55, 52].
Railway Research - Selected Topics on Development, Safety and Technology100
RU Domain Events : E-RU-1; Shared property are labelled Emergent Properties that threaten the safety of railway operations
IM Domain Events : E-IM-1
ECF Chart Showing flow of operational events Sh 1 of 3
Road User Domain Events : E-U-1, E-U-2
See Continuation Sheet 2
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Figure 4. Representation of the concept of operations of ABCL Facility signalled by traditional lineside signalling
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3.4. Energy barrier trace analysis
From the RAIB Report(s), the information available from the stakeholder organisations
websites, the following worksheet is generated. This worksheet forms the starting point of the
root cause analysis.





vulnerable person or thing
SB2




(train movement into the crossing
space) when barriers are raised
None present at the time of incident ERTMS Cab Signalling (not provided
with movement and braking
information when approaching level
crossings) does not apply to national
signalling infrastructure (incomplete
data for safety analysis).
Latent error: status quo bias
Restriction on train speed
(not provided with information at level
crossings). Latent error: status quo bias
Obstacle detection (not provided).
Latent error: habit bias.
Lifting barriers (provided) but not
inerlocked with train movement.
Latent error: habit bias.
Approaching locking (not identified in
the RAIB report). Latent error: habit
bias.
Interlocking system (did not provide
function of locking barriers with train
braking function).
Latent error: illusion of validity of driver’s
expertise.
Did not provide bridges, underpass,
etc.
Latent error: illusion of control.
Table 1. For Energy Barrier Trace Analysis (EBTA) worksheet
Logic of combinations may be applied to the following table. The author does not agree to the
Pearson’s idea that causation and correlation can be inferred in the same way [23].Credit to
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God is given at the user level crossings where no indication of approaching train can be
percieved or passenger manages to escape the accident [73, 74]. Otherwise, the table indicates
that level crossings are accidents waiting to happen. This table can be interpreted again using
the Prof James Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model as well. The ECFA activity yields information on
unsafe acts. But the precursor information on regulatory, organizational oversights is available
from the EBTA and MORT charts.
It  is  clear  from the  foregoing  particular  description  of  the  ABCL incident  by  RAIB,  an
ineffective system was deployed. The method of application of the MORT under the SIRI
Methodology has  been described in  2011 and 2012 [2,  6,  7,  9].  Call  for  replacement  for
bridges is  not  met  easily due to failure on the part  of  social  actors  to  percieve the risk
correctly.  Further  erroneous interactions  between distant  components  of  Route  Manage‐
ment System and level crossings user’s intention leading to fatality at the level crossing site
are noted in the accident literature [70].
To consider how and why the hazardous system was deployed and safeguards were not
provided, it is necessary to apply the MORT questionnaire, as an organisation framework, to
the RAIB report and related literature to arrive at all factors involved in contributing to the
incident. MORT audit questionnaire is freely available online at www. nri.eu.com [35, 37].
3.5. Information on hazard causal factors: SIRI MORT representation
The application of MORT audit questions (2002 version) and the elicited following responses
are characterised as human errors [35, 37]. Readers are requested to enlarge the images to make
them readable. The Lessons learnt from the 2011 Incident and evidences drawn from the RAIB
Report 11/2012 and 2010 RSSB Road and Rail Interface Report are described together with the
evidence to support the reasoning in the form of a fault tree representation. The MORT Causal
Trees for engineering and managerial are represented in Figure 5, Figure 6, and Figure 7. The
hueristics and biases shown are not mapped to organisations involved in Figure 5. Such
mapping may be carried out with the available information. The information contained in the
MORT Top Tree derives from the managerial and engineering branches and evidences from
the requirements for safety management system, generation, operation and maintenance of
system safey case from UK and European Commissions Norms.
The inspection of the above diagram shows that how the hazards, and heuristics and biases
involved in safety risk information processing at the knowldege -based level with a potential
of loss of 32 lives with 99% probability as per standard Cauchy distribution with statistical
median of 0.72 fatality per 1,000 ABCL level crossings and scale factor equal to 1 were not
analysed. The neglect of base rates can be seen from the HS2 Risk Report [27]. Fault within
fault tree analysis labelled as out of sight out of mind bias is self evident in this case study.
The mean weighted fatality rate of 0.72 fatalities for road vehicle passengers is taken from RSSB
Report dated 2010 [60]. The basis of the calculations and more elaboration of the causal tree
follows.
The information on the hazard causal factors will be appreciated when the information is
placed in the frame of reference using the concept of operations diagram (see Figure 3).
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It should be noted that ERTMS Safety Experts do acknowledge that Command Control &
Signalling Technical Interoperability Specification (TSI) cannot itself gaurantee the safety of
system since the National Part of Signalling System and an interface to it is outside the TSI
Scope (pp. 206) [82]. The way to integrate man–machine interactions, operational rules, or non-
inter-operability technical components into system safety analysis, as per the European
Railway Agency, is to treat the safety performance of inter-operable constituents as a fixed
factor and derive safety requirements for the non-TSI constituents. ERA arguments is that top
down decomposition and allocation of probabilities ignores the human factors in risk assess‐
ments, fault tree analysis, and allocation of physical, human and social capital. The Consensus
decision making process adopted at the RSSB Signalling Standards Committee level does not
use any system analysis to detect conflicts between various types of requirements which give
rise to human factor concerns. In other words, Group think bias due to assignable causes or
optimism fallacy can manifest in such decision settings due to systematic human failings in
lack of systems engineering process in specification of safety requirements, risk analysis &
modelling and human factors investigation. ERA is aware of incompleteness of the generic
risk analysis but RSSB does not include human factors concerns.
Less than adequate competence of professional heads of signalling, risk assessment, inde‐
pendent review, operations, human factors, safety, and systems engineering disciplines at
regulatory, safety, duty-holder, supplier and validation organisations is a natural conclusion
that can be drawn from the case study. The Greek philosopher, Plato once asked who will
  Oversights and Ommissions MORT Branch     Assumed Risk MORT Branch  
Figure 5. SIRI MORT Top Tree (Page 1)
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guard the guardians via Glaucon who thought it was absurd to consider their oversight (Plato’s
Republic). This was the original thesis stated by author in his 2006 publication [3]. The
European Process for SafetyAuthorisation as defined in by Peter Winter in the UIC Compen‐
dium on ERTMS in 2009 for the safety certification did not assure the safety operability albiet
technical inter-operability of components has been attained (pp.128) [81]. Identifying, inter‐
pretation of current state, evaluating of options, identification of target (safe) state, specifying
the safety goal for the Cambrian ERTMS Implementation which forms five crucial stages of
decision making of Skills-Rules-Knowledge Decision Model were less than adequate. The
work groups invovled did not have the interest of public safety at the heart of their decision
making activity (pp. 369) [49]. Management Oversight and Risk Tree’s decision model provides
the idea that noise generated by political rhetoric overshadows the signal of less than adequate
design of level crossings. Author has observed the tendency on the part of safety organisations
to club several safety and human factors engineering technqiues such as Hazop, Fault and
Event Tree Analysis, Operator Task Analysis to conduct safety critical analysis and has raised
this concerns with Chair of Human Factors Working Group of UK INCOSE set up recently [6].
The feedback on this document is awaited. However, the safety case for ERTMS/ETCS is
difficult to generate using the existing safety management methods was argued by the author
at RSSB in January 2010 [10].
Incomplete system definitions cannot be used for system safety analysis is learnt from the the
literature of control systems engineering from the UK HSE Guidance Note HSG238 as well
[73]. However, this vital fact has been omitted by RSSB research managers is learnt from
reading this research paper published in 2011 [22]. In other words, if operator error and
signalling technical error are contributory causes ( ignoring latent errors) then to attain SIL4
target for the overall system, the state of being at risk due to technical and signalling equipment
failure has to exceed one chance per hundred billion opportunities per hour. This is under the
assumption train driver’s behavior is logically equivalent to a low demand SIL2 system from
past data and including effect of immutable human nature discovered by David Hume. [65,
66, 80].
In other words, human error rate has to exceed SIL4 level if we include latent errors as well.
The question of conjunction fallacy naturally arises if the final cause of the hazard is to be
investigated together with its material (national signalling failure rate), formal (failure rate of
risk management system), and effective causes (failure of human factors), as per Prof Jens
Rasmussen’s idea of Aristoteleian causal representation as applied to hazardous events and
theory of probability as well (36), (pp. 53) [53]. Thus, the idea of fat tail risk has escaped the
attention of ERTMS specification writers, European Rail Agency safety experts, and safety risk
experts at GB rail national safety bodies and duty-holders. This social phenomena is not new.
Aircraft industry shows similar tendecies as well [13, 49].
The meaning of hazards management is restricted to storing information on databases rather
than eliminate hazards can be seen from a metro railway project Report in 2009 [30]. Further,
the idea of conjunction of random failure events of redundant information processors has been
paid attention, but fat tail risk problem showing up as group-think bias is not entertained in
the risk literature by ERTMS designers, regulators, duty-holders, and standard bodies as noted
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byNobel laureate Daniel Kahneman and Sanjeev Appicharla [4, 36]. Review of RSSB Safety
Risk Model in 2012 did not refer to the errors that could occur in the usage of Bow-tie models
as it has been shown in the accident investigation of loss of military aircraft, Nimrod in the
Nimrod Report in 2009. Accident pre-cursor models do not include managerial, and engineer‐
ing oversight and tendencyto assume risks can be seen from this review. Less than adequate
technical review of fault tree analysis can be seen from this reference [24]. Further, the Review
Report did not raise concerns over the subject matter experts using normalising constants in
the risk equation as highlighted by Prof Paul Slovic [25, 36, 78]. Further, the familiar short-cuts
have been taken to selecction of goals, task and execution of decision process as per Prof Jens
Figure 6. SIRI MORT SB2 Branch.
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Rasmussen’s SRK model of eight stage process of decision making and the potential hazard
of train colliding with a road vechicle was not recognised by senior managers as per Prof James
Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model. The tendency not to eliminate risk within British Railway days
is noted by risk and regulation expert, Prof Hutter [41].
The MORT results have shown the relevent hueristics and resulting biases incorporated into
the MORT analysis shows a different risk picture than the expert railway safety and economic
managers can imagine. An integrated analysis of quantified risk assessment, wider human
factors via Swiss Cheese Model, and decision errors at the knowledge -based level called latent
errors to show resident pathogens via cognitive systems engineering approach in an applica‐
tion of MORT is a novelty. This need is stated in RSSB Research Project calling for formal
procedures to be applied to the task of assessment of rules and staff of RSSB as well [19, 2–
11]. The decisions taken by various organisations show that these stakeholder organisations
were not optimising safety for the road users, passengers, and staff.
The incident occurred as RSSB/Network Rail did not consider inclusion of level crossing
functionality into the Cambrian ERTMS Automatic Train Protection System. The decision-
making process used by RSSB Signalling Standards Committee for deciding upon the imple‐
mentation of mandatory safety requirements specified within the Railway Group Standards
was less than adequate as it failed to take into worst-case scenario of risk possible and the EU
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Figure 7. SIRI MORT SA2 Branch.
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Techncial Specification for Inter-Operability did exclude the functionality. The hazard analysis
process used to close out the hazards failed to take into account wider and local human factors
due to this exclusion [49, 55, 69]. Further, linear interaction between Design of the System with
Operator (train driver and level crossing user) is not an hidden interaction in the work
situationand therefore, from a complex systems persective, the ABCL Incident is simply a
component failure accident [55].
4. Conclusion
The reasons for persisent use of wrong-but-popular approaches like cost-benefit analysis, and
fault and event tree models for safety justification, identification of accident pre-cursors, and
management of safety risk through independent safety assessment approach were presented
in the chapter.
The Cambrian ERTMS case study has identified all engineering, managerial, organisational,
and regulatory actions which have contributed to the ERTMS Safety Critical Incident using
the SIRI methodology. The case study showed various heuristics and biases that were active
in the railway industry. This is a novel use of hueristics and biases appraoch within the
cognitive systems engineering tradition without omitting any stakeholder organisation in the
SRK, MORT, and SCM analysis.
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